It is therefore important to examine the interests involved in the development of the Kyoto Protocol.
Risk, Science and National Circumstances
In a political sense, the most significant winners and losers in relation to climate change policy are perhaps those affected by the policy radier dian by die risk of ac celerated climate change. The costs of climate change will be remote in dme and interests affected by them poorly organised, but die winners and losers associated widi the policies adopted are in die present and much better organised. But it is important to bear in mind diat die assessment of the risk posed by accelerated cli mate change depends crucially upon die circumstances of nadonal and sectoral ac tors. One's risk assessment differs substantially depending on whether one lives in a low-lying island state, or a state widi substantial low-lying land such as Bangladesh or die Nedierlands, or an elevated inland state (Adams, 1995) . Risk assessment cannot be based upon science alone. It inevitably reflects differing national circum stances and subjective factors. Indeed, one of die problems widi die Intergovern mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process is diat it seeks in many ways to make a risk assessment which die scientists involved are not qualified to make, and which should be left to die policy-makers. For example, die controversy over die attribution of past observed climatic change to human agency in die Second As sessment Report of die IPCC (Houghton et al., 1996) reflects tensions between the need to produce a scientific consensus and die national and sectoral interests of some participants: die US State Department played a role in revisions to downplay die uncertainty in die science, while fossil fuel interests raised diese revisions as a political issue.
The view diat a consensus must be produced, radier dian allowed to emerge from traditional scientific controversy (as was die case widi chloroflurocarbons), presupposes dial action will not be taken unless a consensus is manufactured, and dius presupposes diat action is needed. Since climate science is based on models of die global climate system which are limited by die computational power of super computers, and so is unlikely to resolve die attribution controversy definitively, a risk assessment performed by die IPCC is likely to continue to be contested by diose widi different interests in die causes, effects, and solutions (see Kerr, 1997) . But this is not only unavoidable: it is desirable. The key policy questions are about what costs we should accept to attempt to mitigate how much climate change, and on die basis of what degree of scientific certainty. Not only is science alone unable to provide die answer; neither can die precautionary principle (which states that lack of full scientific certainty should not be a reason for inaction), since it cannot tell us how much precaution we should exercise. Such questions are inescapably political, and inextricably bound up widi questions of ethics and interests.
To assume diat interests do not matter, and that die imperative of die IPCC scientific consensus and a common direat of climate change will produce an effec tive and workable international instrument to it, is to risk the whole ability of the international system to respond to die problem. Diverging risk assessments are then likely to take over, at the cost not only of the loss of effective response to the risk of climate change, but an even further loss of faith in international processes and institutions. But since there are problems for which effective international ca pacity is needed, we need to develop a policy response which takes account of the political economy of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties in December 1997.
Interests and Morality in Climate Change Policy
A basic difficulty in identifying the interests at stake in the FCCC is that they are confused by a moral cloak of equality which, paradoxically, is grossly unequal. One of die fundamental daws widi die FCCC, widi which Australia took issue, is die egalitarian appeal which made agreement in Rio de Janeiro possible: the non binding commitment of stabilisadon of emissions at 1990 levels for Annex I nadons (essendally die OECD countries plus Eastern Europe and die former Soviet Union) by 2000. Bodi die egalitarianism of diat commitment (and of later calls for uniform reducdons in emissions from the European Union (EU) and Alliance of Small Is land States for Kyoto) and die use of 1990 as a base year were so unjust as to jeop ardise any delivery on commitments.
It was Anatole France (1894) who wrote of die 'majesdc equality of die law, which forbids die rich as well as die poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in die streets, and to steal bread'. The circumstances of nadons differ hugely: levels of wealdi, rates of populadon growdi, rates of economic growdi, energy-intensiveness of dieir economies, requirements for transport, headng and cooling, and energy sources available as die result of natural-resource endowments and past investment decisions. Any requirement which ignores diese differences in die interest of a quick consensus-generadng appeal to equality is doomed to fail.
The examples of die United Kingdom and Germany, which formed die selfinterested basis of die EU posidon, reveal die injusdce diat can be masked by seemingly equal commitments. The privatisation of die UK electricity sector in 1990 and die subsequent demise of die coal mining industry resulted in a 'dash for gas' which made any reducdons in CO2 emissions much less difficult for die UK, since gas produces fewer emissions per unit of electricity generated; moreover, new combined-cycle generation lifts conversion efficiencies from the order of 40 per cent to around 50 per cent, reducing CO2 emissions by 60 per cent compared widi coal. The dash for gas was made possible also by die relaxation in 1990 of a 1974 EU Directive prohibiting die use of gas (as a premium fuel) for electricity genera tion, and by die need for die UK to limit sulphur dioxide emissions. (A similar 'premium fuel' policy in Victoria can be seen to have resulted in Statecommissioned 3000MW of brown coal plant over die past decade which was only 25 per cent diermally efficient, dius producing more CO2 per unit of electricity.) UK gas plant capacity and generation now account for about 20 per cent of all fossil fuel capacity and generation (Bantock & Longhurst, 1995) , resulting in a windfall emissions reduction, unrelated to climate change policies, of about 12 per cent in the electricity sector since 1990.
Germany was particularly advantaged by both the uniform targets approach and by die selection of 1990 as die base year. German reunificadon occurred in Octo ber 1990; over the following year, economic acdvity in the former East Germany contracted by 23 per cent and total primary energy consumpdon declined by around 30 per cent (Boehmer-Chrisdansen et al., 1993) . Ironically, some Euro pean nadons such as the Netherlands and Denmark were disadvantaged by die se lection of 1990 as a base year, because climatic conditions that year gave diem an abnormally low level of energy use and dius greenhouse gas emissions as a target.
The 'European bubble' proposal involved setting a single reduction target for the EU, while allowing different targets for each member nation. It dius allowed the serendipitous gains of Germany and die UK to be offset against die excesses of Greece and Portugal, which were to be permitted to increase their emissions by around 30 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Luxembourg was to have reduced its emissions by 30 per cent, but it can import energy -as can much of Western Europe (Sweden is laying an undersea cable to Poland, for example). But die issue raised by the European embrace of differentiated responses is not only diat it was unjust diat die EU alone should differentiate, but diat, if political agreement within an organisation such as the EU, widi its single market and a planned single cur rency, required recognition to be given to the different national circumstances of its member states, what real prospect was diere of wordiwhile multilateral agreement being secured without differentiation?
Agreement among Annex I Parties in Kyoto was secured only after acceptance of die need for differentiation by Japan and (eventually) die US. Russia offered to trade its windfall emission reductions, and die US negotiators fashioned a bloc based around Annex I members of die Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, which Russia had joined only die previous week, crafting an 'umbrella' of differentiated responses to counter die ELI bubble. The negotiation took on all die appearances of a trade negotiation and only an outcome which took account of differing national interests was possible. The agreement included differ entiated responses from Annex I Parties, widi die net effect diat dieir aggregate emissions of die six most important greenhouse gases would be reduced by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in die budget period of 2008-2012. The EU was re quired to reduce emissions by 8 per cent below 1990 levels, die US by 7 per cent, and Japan by 6 per cent; while, in addition to increases by individual nations within die ELI (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Sweden), increases were allowed to Aus tralia (8 per cent), Iceland (10 per cent) and Norway (1 per cent). The agreement also provided for emissions trading, details of which were to be determined at the Fourdi Conference of die Parties in Buenos Aires in November 1998.
The Kyoto outcomes are relatively modest, but tiiey are steps towards die de velopment of workable policy instruments diat have some prospect of being ratified and honoured (aldiough it must be acknowledged diat US ratification is problem atic, and Annex 1 Parties will be looking to Washington before diey act). Kyoto represents the failure of the 'blame and shame' tactics adopted by non-government organisations (NGOs), which sought to promote the moral case for protection from climate change and supported the European position for uniform cuts. Uniform emission targets were not only politically infeasible, but, because of different abate ment costs in different countries, inefficient in economic terms and thus wasteful of resources (unless factors such as energy taxes were to be harmonised first). Many commentators have viewed the Montreal Protocol, with its precedent of interna tional agreement in the face of a scientific consensus, as the model for FCCC; but whereas die ozone issue affected a few chemicals of marginal importance, for which some industrial interests made substitutes, climate change entails activities which are of central importance to the national interests of industrialised states. Climate sci ence is also much more complex and much more uncertain, especially with regard to the effects of climate change. The negotiation of die Protocol showed clearly that differences in interests between parties must be recognised and negodated, and that attempts to submerge diem in moral injunctions would not suffice (Sprinz & Vaalitoranta, 1994; Kellow, 1997) .
Trading Emission Rights vs Carbon Taxes
Consideration of die political economy of die Kyoto Protocol leads us to consider the kind of policy instruments that might be adopted to mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions internationally.
Uniform percentage reductions using regulatory approaches are clearly inferior, especially since diey are capable of producing counterproductive effects by creating perverse incentives (Maloney & Brady, 1988) . A policy of percentage reductions of sulphur dioxide emissions in die US favoured die use of high sulphur coal, and was claimed to have produced worse outcomes dian would have occurred in die ab sence of any policy. Kyoto reflects an awareness of diis, especially since die absence of commitments by developing countries is likely to have simply resulted in carbon leakage. But such approaches sit well widi die 'blame and shame' approach of die NGOs, which locks die problem into die Nordi-Soudi debate. Economic incen tives, while usually more effective instruments, are not universally preferred. For reasons explained below, an emissions trading regime, as provided for in die Kyoto Protocol, is to be preferred to the main alternative of an international emissions tax; but die continuing opposition to eidicr mechanism, largely reflecting an ediical ob jection to any permissive approach to die 'sin' of pollution, could result in difficul ties being created in negotiations leading to die development of an emissions trading regime (see Goodin, 1992) . The NGOs could well work to sabotage the highly complex negotiations which must now occur, by attempting to burden the regime widi unworkable or unreasonable requirements. Care will be needed to avoid this.
Why is emissions trading to be preferred to taxes? A uniform carbon tax ap plied in all countries would achieve welfare-efficient abatement if the tax were set at die marginal damage costs of CO2 emissions. But die exact nature and value of the physical damage remain unknown. Besides, if such taxes were to be collected do mestically, diey would create a compliance problem, since they could be partially olTset by governments reducing existing energy taxes, thus undermining the effec tiveness of die international tax. If carbon taxes were to be collected internationally, this would imply a loss of sovereignty which would go beyond die level entailed in the FCCC. There is no precedent for a supranadonal agency collecdng taxes. An additional problem is diat international taxes, when combined widi the double standards provision of die FCCC exempting developing countries from binding commitments, could encourage carbon leakage, since taxes would suppress demand in Annex I nations, dius resulting in lower world prices for fossil fuels and encour aging increased consumption in non-Annex I nations.
Tradeable permits are regarded as preferable to taxes when die costs of abate ment are known widi greater certainty dian die costs of potential damages and diere is a significant probability of catastrophic damage (Pearce & Turner, 1990) . These conditions certainly obtain widi greenhouse-gas emissions. Once emission permits have been distributed, dieir value can reflect bodi developing views of die serious ness of die problem and the cost at which abatement can be achieved, and die mar ket can reflect bodi changes in scientific knowledge and technological advances without governments having to readjust die level of taxes. If diere are significant advances in photovoltaics, nuclear fusion, or COa removal from power station emissions, permits will have a lesser value and diis will be reflected in die cost of electricity from fossil fuels.
Faxes have die advantage of providing (at least potentially) less uncertainty over price, but at die cost of greater uncertainty over die quantity of emissions. They have some appeal to economists, but diey are less likely to be favoured in decision processes driven by science and inevitably centred on atmospheric concentrations and dius quantitative emission limitations and reductions -as die Kyoto process was. Moreover, uncertainties over price under a trading regime can be addressed by futures trading.
The creation of a market in permits, including a futures market to guide longerterm infrastructure decisions, has considerable appeal to economists. Such a mar ket 'should automatically clear at die global marginal cost of CO2 control, dius eliminating the centrally determined estimates of such costs needed to impose an international tax' (Mabey et al., 1997:31) . The use of such market instruments is preferred by economists as an alternative to heavy-handed 'regulation', but it should be remembered diat diey must diemselves be underpinned by regulation. This is most obvious in die case of compliance issues in a market for permits, since some form of penalty must be set if nations emit more carbon dian is covered by dieir permits. Since such penalties would have to be imposed by some international body, emissions trading raises sovereignty issues, just as taxes would.
Permit trading between nations would also give diem flexibility in dieir own use of policy instruments to meet dieir targets: taxes, regulation, subsidies or domestic trading schemes. Such flexibility extends, of course, to die international level. Na tions could chose whedier or not to trade once die distribution of entidements were decided, and could make dieir own decisions based on their assessment of abate ment costs and odier national circumstances.
The Kyoto Protocol allows international trading between firms; and while it does not make die establishment of a domestic emissions trading regime compul sory, it is highly likely that nations will decide to establish such systems as a means of integrating domestic climate change policy with the international system. The full ramifications of such developments will become evident only with time. Divisions will emerge between industrial sectors, most obviously between 'sink' sectors (such as forestry) and emitting sectors. It will take a considerable time for all these sectors to understand how their interests are affected. The proposal by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997) for national based emissions trading only in the absence of targets would have been much less problematic, but that is now not likely to be adopted unless Kyoto fails -as is possible.
There would appear to be insufficient time between now and the Fourth Con ference of die Pardes in November 1998 for die details of an internadonal emission trading regime to be defined and designed, let alone negodated. A likely outcome is a 'Buenos Aires Mandate', followed by anodier series of meetings of an ad hoc group to progress it. Yet international climate change policy appears headed in die right direction.
If entidements are distributed initially much in line widi existing uses, and re lied national determinations of abatement costs, dieir impact need not be too se vere and industry will not oppose diem as vigorously as diey would taxes. Ques tions arise over such issues as entidements for new industries, but diere is no reason why diey cannot be purchased from sink industries such as forestry or from diose making energy-efficiency gains or odier means of abatement. This is likely to affect die competitiveness of location in Australia only marginally for most industries, since energy costs are only one of several locational factors. Given diat brownfields expansion in sectors such as aluminium smelting is likely to be cheaper dian greenfields expansion elsewhere, and given diat Australia still has substantial reserves of cheap coal, assigning property rights to carbon emission entidements will not have die same impact on Australia's future economic prospects dial a percentage reduc tion widi no trading would have -while still creating incentives for emission re ductions and sink creations.
An emissions trading regime could be responsive to die emerging science over bodi die extent of climate change and die distribution of its costs and benefits, whereas diis would not be possible widi carbon taxes, since one needs a good idea of die amount of die damage in order to set die rate of tax. While die rate of tax could be adjusted in die light of climate science, a tax could not be guaranteed to deliver die specified quantified reductions favoured by international negotiations.
An issue diat has to be resolved is die incorporation of reductions in land clearing in Australia's allocation of permits, and how die gains resulting from reduc tions in clearing rates since 1990 should be distributed. A further issue is who should benefit from sink creation paid for under the Natural Heritage Trust Fund. These issues imply a need (presumably) to enforce covenants over land-based sinks to ensure that subsequent landholders continue to manage them in such a way that diey continue to lock up carbon. The superiority of emissions trading makes it worthwhile to resolve these problems, even though they are not likely to be resolved in time for the meeting in Buenos Aires.
Environmental Technology and Unintended Consequences
A note of caution should be sounded about die possible unintended environmental effects of emissions trading. Enthusiasts for different energy sources, whether in spired by technical or economic considerations, are prone to understate the associ ated drawbacks. In die early 1980s, die Tasmanian Hydro-electric Commission often claimed that (land use and wilderness values aside) hydro-electricity was nonpolludng. This claim overlooked die temperature pollution which can kill wildlife when water is released from deep storages, the supersaturation widi nitrogen which can result from releases from high spillways, and die heavy metals which can be mobilised from vegetation and geological formations. As well, die methane re leased from the creation of a hydro storage in some locations could have roughly the same effect on climate change as would die generation of an equivalent amount of energy by die burning of fossil fuels.
This principle extends to many of the technologies that are advocated so en thusiastically as being 'renewable'. The largest wind farm in the world, at Altamont in California, has a visual impact, makes noise, causes soil erosion and kills more birds every year dian were killed by die Exxon Valdez, die oil tanker diat foundered on die Alaskan coast in 1989. Solar diermal and photovoltaic arrays have similar impacts, and photovoltaic cell production gives rise to emissions of toxic arsenic, gallium and cadmium. The land requirements for central photovoltaic arrays are 2-4ha/MW of installed capacity, and solar diermal slighdy more. A 2000MW power station would tiius require in die order of 5000ha of land, which would have to be purchased and would amount to a substantial 'footprint' in an important habitat. Such technologies should not necessarily be eschewed -many of the impacts noted above can be minimised widi careful siting, for example -but tiieir costs as well as dieir benefits should be calculated. In view of diis, attempts at 'green energy' labelling which include die renewables listed above but exclude coal-bed methane (see, for example, SEDA, 1997) are open to question. Given diat coal is likely to be extracted to some extent in Australia for a very long time, it makes sense to use a significant greenhouse gas to produce energy radier than to release it into die at mosphere.
Conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol has not been widely welcomed. Environmentalists in Australia tend to see it as letting Australia off lighdy, while greenhouse sceptics reject it as im posing legally binding requirements to reduce emissions they see as unwarranted. l See Bradley (1997) . It should be noted that Bradley is an enthusiast for gas, but this underscores the need for the different interests on issues such as climate change to probe the weaknesses o f different schools.
Especially because it does not include any binding commitments from developing countries (not even to slow growth in emissions), its ratification by the US Senate is highly problematic.
Realistically, Kyoto must be seen as the first step in a long process to create a set o f 'insurance institutions'. Much detail in terms of compliance mechanisms and provisions for emissions trading is yet to be defined, and this is not likely to be completed at the next Conference of the Parties. But while Kyoto was but a first step, it inaugurated a journey in a promising direction. While some might argue for the superiority of taxes, the provision for emissions trading adopted in Kyoto ap pears better suited to both the problem in hand and the realities of international negotiation, aldiough both raise important issues such as sovereignty.
The acceptance of differentiation was inevitable since Parties would commit only to what they considered equitable in die context of die circumstances of odiers. In die face of die European bubble, no responsible government is likely to have committed to a binding target which implied a greater burden for its cidzens than was being accepted by die Europeans. If die special circumstances of Spain, Greece, and Sweden were accepted widiin die EU as grounds for allowing differendated commitments, dien why should diose of Iceland, Norway and Australia be ignored? And if Germany and die UK could trade dieir windfall reduedons within die EU, why not Russia widiin APEC? Not only was differentiation fair, it was realisdcally die only possible outcome Kyoto represents die triumph of interests over idealism in international nego tiations. It is a modest success which remains vulnerable to bodi interests and ide als.
